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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Patrice Canton (“Canton”) appeals the District Court‟s February 12, 
2010 Order granting Appellee‟s (“Kmart”) motion for summary judgment.  Canton filed 
a personal injury action against Kmart to recover economic damages resulting from her 
physical injuries received during a slip and fall accident.  While shopping in the Kmart 
store at the Sunny Isle Shopping Center in St. Croix, Virgin Islands, Canton slipped on a 
clear, liquid substance on the floor in one of the aisles and was physically injured.  She 
argues that the District Court improperly granted Kmart‟s summary judgment motion, 
because there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact 
regarding Kmart‟s actual and constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that 
existed prior to her fall. 
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order granting 
Kmart‟s motion for summary judgment. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and shall recount only the 
essential facts.  While Canton was shopping in Kmart, she slipped on a clear, liquid 
substance that was on the floor.  After Canton fell, she could see and feel the liquid 
substance.  She also saw an open gallon bottle of Dial liquid soap on the shelf near the 
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area where she slipped.  Canton also noted that the cap was off and a quarter of the soap 
was missing from the bottle. 
A second Kmart customer, Carolyn Roberts (“Roberts”), came to Canton‟s aid 
after she fell.  Roberts saw a large amount of gel on the floor, and noticed a large bottle 
of Dial liquid soap on the shelf with the cap half way off.  While standing in the area 
immediately after Canton fell, Roberts noted that she heard a Kmart employee admit that 
someone told her about the spill but that she [the employee] failed to respond to the spill 
right away.  The employee also stated that the spill was in the area where Canton fell.  
Roberts also observed that she did not notice anything on the floor when she first passed 
through the area, before Canton‟s fall. 
The first Kmart employee on the scene, (not the employee Roberts purportedly 
overheard) Valine JeanBaptiste (“JeanBaptiste”), observed a long skid mark on the floor, 
and also observed that the liquid on the floor was from a large bottle of liquid soap.  She 
also noted that the liquid soap bottle was open, on its side, hanging off of the shelf, and 
that the cap was unscrewed.  A second Kmart employee (now former employee), Soria 
Warner (“Warner”) acknowledged that although Kmart has a policy regarding spills, the 
employees do not police for spills, report spills, clean the spills, or place warning signs 
around the spills.
1
  According to Warner, Kmart does not discipline employees who fail 
to follow the policy. 
                                                 
1
 Kmart‟s policy requires that employees constantly monitor the store for spills.  When 
they become aware of a spill, the employee is required to stay at the spill until someone 
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After the fall, another Kmart employee, (“Tony”) took photographs of the area 
where Canton slipped and fell.  Kmart‟s policy requires that all photos are labeled, 
attached to the incident report and sent to the Kmart Customer Incident Center.  Kmart 
admitted, through its representatives, that photographs had been taken, and that there was 
video surveillance of the accident.  However, neither the photographs nor the videotape 
were preserved for trial.
2
   
In June 2009, after suit had been filed, Canton filed a Motion for Sanctions for 
Spoliation of Evidence, because Kmart had failed to retain the surveillance material.  
Specifically, Canton sought the District Judge‟s sanction of Kmart‟s conduct by 
permitting an inference of spoliation at trial.  The District Judge granted the motion 
regarding the photographs, but denied the motion as to the video surveillance, 
determining that, based on the testimony of a Kmart employee on duty at the time of the 
alleged incident, “and in the absence of any affirmative evidence provided by Plaintiff 
that surveillance video actually existed of the alleged accident, the Court finds that no 
surveillance videotape existed such that Defendant had a duty to maintain it.”  (J. App. 
4.)  The District Judge ordered that a jury instruction, noting that the photographs would 
                                                                                                                                                             
comes with a barricade and cleans the spill, so that they can warn customers.  If an 
employee learns of a spill, that employee is required to immediately go to the spill, 
barricade it and stay at the area of the spill until it is clean.  See J. App. 720-22 and 689. 
2
 Kmart‟s policy for video surveillance tapes requires that employees immediately review 
the videotape to ensure that the incident was recorded, then pull and preserve the entire 
cassette(s) as evidence.  The cassette is then labeled as evidence, and includes the 




have provided evidence that the spill existed for a sufficient period of time to have given 
Kmart notice before Canton fell, was appropriate. 
In April 2009, Kmart filed a motion for summary judgment.  On February 10, 
2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Kmart‟s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that there was not sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine dispute of fact regarding Kmart‟s actual or constructive notice of the spill. 
 Canton filed a timely appeal. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court=s grant of summary judgment, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We review the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment de novo.  Azur v. 
Chase Bank, USA, Nat‟l Ass‟n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To that end, we are 
required to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.”  Chambers 
ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
III. ANALYSIS 
Summary Judgment 
 Summary judgment is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Azur, 601 F.3d at 
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216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c))).
3
  To be material, a fact must have the potential to alter the outcome of 
the case.  See Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Once the 
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the non-
moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.”  Azur, 601 
F.3d at 216.  In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, “[t]he evidence of 
the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 
favor.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986);  Chambers, 587 F.3d 
at 181.  “Further, [w]e may affirm the District Court=s order granting summary judgment 
on any grounds supported by the record.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (2009). 
To survive summary judgment, “affirmative evidence - - regardless of whether it 
is direct or circumstantial - - must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less 
(in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.”  Williams v. Borough of West 
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). 
Duty of Care to Invitees 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees 
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
                                                 
3
  The standard previously set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as subsection (a).  
The language of this subsection is unchanged, except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ 




care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk 
of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against the danger.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965). 
“An invitee is entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to 
ascertain the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it 
reasonably safe by repair or to give warning of the actual condition and the risk involved 
therein. Therefore an invitee is not required to be on the alert to discover defects which, if 
he were a mere licensee, entitled to expect nothing but notice of known defects, he might 
be negligent in not discovering.”  Id. 
Breach of Duty 
Canton contends that Kmart breached its duty to protect an invitee from harm 
while on Kmart‟s property.  To establish a breach of duty, Canton must prove that Kmart 
“had either direct [actual] or constructive notice of the foreign substance on the floor as a 
potentially dangerous condition.”  See David v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, 740 
F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted).  “The issue of prior notice to the 
store, either actual or constructive, of an unreasonable risk of harm is more difficult to 
establish than establishing the presence of a foreign substance on the floor.”  Id. at 234.  
Actual notice exists if the store had been warned about the condition of the spill on the 
floor beforehand.  Canton could show constructive notice by demonstrating that the floor 
condition had existed for such a length of time that the storeowner, in the exercise of 
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ordinary care, should have been aware of the condition.  See id. at 236.  It is difficult to 
prove slip and fall cases, involving foreign substances on grocery market floors.  Id. at 
233-34.  The major issues ordinarily involve the following: 
(1) Was there a foreign substance on the floor?  
(2) What notice, either actual or constructive, did the employees or the 
management have of this particular condition which involves “an 
unreasonable risk of harm” to the business invitees?  
(3) Absent direct testimony proving actual notice, was the foreign 
substance on the floor long enough to give management or employees 
constructive notice of this potential “unreasonable risk of harm”? 
Id.  (Internal citation omitted.) 
Canton’s Slip and Fall Claim 
Canton has proven the first element above, as evidenced by the statement from the 
District Court, that “There is no dispute that Canton slipped and fell; there was a slippery 
substance on the floor; and, Kmart did not warn her.  The dispute is whether Kmart had 
or should have had notice of the liquid on the floor before the incident.”  J. App. 18.   
Actual Notice 
Canton argues that there is evidence in the record constituting actual notice; 
specifically, Roberts‟s testimony.  Roberts stated that she overheard a Kmart employee 
saying “someone did tell me something‟s on the floor.  But I didn‟t go right away to see 
what it was.”  J. App. 218-20.   Roberts described the employee as a slim, dark-skinned, 
short woman, but did not know the woman‟s name.  The District Court properly denied 
the admission of Roberts‟s testimony regarding the Kmart employee as hearsay, although 
Canton contends that the statement was an admission of a party opponent.  The District 
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Court found that because the identity of the employee was not known, it was not possible 
to determine if the statement was made by the woman within the scope of her 
employment.   
Canton argues that because Kmart has a policy that all employees, once notified of 
a spill, are required to immediately go to the area of the spill, barricade it, and clean up 
the spill, the statement was within the employee‟s scope of employment.   
Canton relies on Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Assoc., 963 F.2d 534 (2d 
Cir. 1992), to support her contention that Roberts‟s testimony should have been admitted 
into evidence.  In Pappas, after the plaintiff‟s slip and fall incident, a friend phoned the 
defendant condominium management company to complain about the icy condition of 
the sidewalk.  Id. at 536.  A man appeared with a shovel and bucket to clear away the ice, 
while making statements that the management company had a poor maintenance record 
for keeping the sidewalk clear.  Id.  The trial court ruled that plaintiff‟s testimony 
regarding the man‟s statement was inadmissible, and concluded that plaintiff did not 
adequately show that the declarant was an agent speaking about a matter over which he 
had been granted authority by the defendant.  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed.  Specifically, the Court found that the statement was admissible, and 
held that circumstantial evidence, along with the statement, could be used to establish the 
scope and existence of a relationship between the person and the management company.  
Id. at 538. 
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Pappas is distinguishable from the present case.  In Pappas, a number of people 
heard and saw the unidentified person, who stated that he was employed by the 
defendant.  Id. at 536.  Here, Roberts testified that she overheard a conversation between 
a purported employee and a second person, and that she knew the speaker was an 
employee because she was wearing a badge.  However, Canton did not provide any 
evidence identifying the speaker as a Kmart employee.  The woman was vaguely 
described by Roberts as “dark skinned and slim and short, with straight hair.”  J. App. 
219.   Roberts also stated that the woman was wearing a Kmart badge, although she could 
not make out the name on the badge.  There was no statement in the record indicating that 
uncovering the employee‟s identity was inhibited in any way.   
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the statement 
Roberts claims to have overheard is inadmissible as hearsay and not admissible through a 
hearsay exception - - whether it be a present sense impression or an excited utterance, 
particularly since  it is not ascribed to anyone.   
“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 801.  A statement made by a party opponent occurs when: 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party‟s own 
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a 
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party‟s agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
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coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
 
The failure to identify the speaker that Roberts purportedly overheard makes it 
impossible to determine whether that person was indeed an employee, who was speaking 
within the scope of her employment.   
Canton suggests that the statement allegedly made by an unidentified Kmart 
employee should have been admitted into evidence as an excited utterance.  Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(2) defines excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event 
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition.” Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 509 (3d Cir. 1985).  We have stated 
that “utterance[s] of [an] unidentified declarant [are] not admissible under Rule 803(2).”  
Carden v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988).  “At 
minimum, when the declarant of an excited utterance is unidentified, it becomes more 
difficult to satisfy the established case law requirements for admission of a statement 
under Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).”  Miller, 754 F.2d at 510.  Those requirements are defined as 
“(1) a startling occasion, (2) a statement relating to the circumstances of the startling 
occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe personally the 
events, and (4) a statement made before there has been time to reflect and fabricate.”  Id. 
(Internal citation omitted.)   
In the instant case, the issue involves a statement made by an unidentified person 
thought to be a Kmart employee.  We find it curious that after voluminous discovery, 
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including numerous depositions, the employee who purportedly made this damning 
statement was never found.  The inability to identify the speaker of the statements Ms. 
Roberts alludes to undermines any notion that this hearsay statement is reliable. 
Constructive Notice 
Canton argues that constructive notice is evidenced by: (1) the spoliation ruling; 
(2) the skid mark on the floor; (3) the condition of the spill; (4) Canton‟s wet clothes; and 
(5) evidence of prior slip and falls.  First, Canton relies on the District Court‟s grant of 
her motion for a spoliation inference based on Kmart‟s inability to produce the 
photographs as evidence of the spill and fall.    
Spoliation occurs when evidence is destroyed or altered, or when a party 
fails to preserve evidence in instances where litigation is pending or 
reasonably foreseeable.  See Micron Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 
F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 
Canton states that the spoliation ruling should have prevented the District Court 
from granting Kmart‟s motion for summary judgment.  While it is true that the lack of 
photographic evidence is a concern in this case, it is also true that a jury may have viewed 
the spoliation inference as an indication of Kmart‟s possible liability.  However, such an 
inference is not dispositive on the issue of constructive notice.   
“When the contents of a document are relevant to an issue in a case, the trier of 
fact generally may receive the fact of the document‟s nonproduction or destruction as 
evidence that the party that has prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear 
that the contents would harm him.”  Bull v. UPS, 665 F.3d 68 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
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Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Here, 
although the missing photographs are important, they do not mandate that the grant of 
summary judgment be jettisoned.  See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 
F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (where the Court of Appeals found that the missing evidence 
had potential relevance, but noted that the relevance would be “minimal”).  The 
photographic evidence here would be cumulative.  Kmart does not argue that the spill did 
not occur, nor does it contest the facts of the spill, as presented.  The photographs would 
not contribute to create a genuine dispute as to a material fact.  There is no error 
regarding the District Court‟s spoliation ruling. 
Canton next argues that Kmart had constructive knowledge, as evidenced by the 
skid mark on the floor, which was assumed to be from someone who had slipped on the 
liquid prior to Canton‟s accident.  However, there is no evidence that the skid mark did 
not result from Canton‟s fall itself.  In her deposition, Canton admitted that she smeared 
some of the liquid across the floor when she fell.  (J. App. 181.)  As such, no reasonable 
inference could be drawn that someone, other than Canton, slipped on the clear liquid 
substance in that area. 
Canton further argues that the amount of liquid missing from the bottle and the 
size of the spill are indicative of the length of time that must have elapsed since the spill.  
Witnesses had testified that the spill itself was large, but there were no footprints or other 
evidence suggesting that the liquid had been on the floor long enough for Kmart to have 
had constructive notice.  In fact, there was nothing in the record to indicate, with any 
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specificity, how long the liquid had been on the floor prior to Canton‟s slip and fall.  We 
cannot engage in speculation, so there is no basis to determine that Kmart had 
constructive notice of the spill. 
Canton also argues that her wet clothes should lead a reasonable jury to conclude 
that the spill had been there long enough to constitute constructive knowledge.  She relies 
on the District Court‟s holding in Williams v. United Corp., 50 V.I. 191, 198 (V.I. 2008) 
to bolster that contention.  However, in Williams, which also involved a slip and fall 
accident, plaintiff not only had evidence of wet clothes, but evidence of muddy shoe 
prints.  Id.  The Court held that Williams‟s testimony regarding muddy footprints could, 
at least when combined with her other evidence, lead a jury to conclude that Plaza had 
constructive notice.  Id.  Here, although Canton contends that her clothes were wet from 
the fall, she does not provide any additional evidence that would support her claim that 
Kmart had constructive notice.    
Finally, Canton argues that evidence of six prior slip and fall accidents at Kmart 
serve as constructive notice.  According to its employees, Kmart had experienced six 
similar falls in the past two years, and did not follow its procedures regarding spills.  This 
argument has no merit.  Past slip and falls at Kmart are not indicative of its failure to 
follow appropriate procedures when there is a spill.  Each of the six cases is fact specific.  
The mere fact that prior slip and falls occurred does not create an inference to be drawn 





Canton has not provided evidence creating a genuine dispute as to any material 
fact.  There is no admissible evidence that Kmart had actual notice of the spill.  There is 
no evidence indicating the length of time the spill had been on the floor, and whether it 
was there long enough for Kmart to have had constructive notice.  The District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment is sound.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s Order granting Kmart‟s motion for summary judgment. 
